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ABSTRACT

PREDICTING BANKRUPTCY AND CATASTROPHIC LOSS: A PORTFOLIO
APPROACH

By
Michael McKibben
May 2017

Dissertation supervised by Dr. Abhay Gaur
This paper uses logistic regression to assign risk of catastrophic loss (defined as a
loss of 80% or more of market cap value) to companies, and analyzes the subsequent
returns of high risk and low risk portfolios. In the final model, the low risk portfolio had
a three-year mean return of approximately 47%, with a catastrophic loss rate of 1.1%.
The high-risk portfolio had a three-year mean return of approximately .5%, with a
catastrophic loss rate of 29%. The paper expands upon a model developed by Dr. Abhay
Gaur and Dr. Leo Rebholz in Rebholz’s 2002 thesis, Bankruptcy as Cusp Catastrophe.
This paper first validates the model, introduces a new variable, which examines financial
momentum, and transforms the bankruptcy variable to catastrophic loss. The success of
the model was viewed through a comparative approach of high and low risk portfolios.
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Introduction

Bankruptcy is an ongoing part of the business cycle. Companies may fail outright, and
enter Chapter 7 liquidation. Other companies may instead be somewhat profitable but struggle
with debts, and renegotiate under Chapter 11. Companies may become vulnerable and merge
with competitors or are taken private to refinance themselves. In all cases, a prospective investor
would have been better off if they had avoided investing in the company. Various metrics have
been used to evaluate the health of the stock and predict bankruptcy, one of the earliest and most
well-known being the Altman Z score, published in 19681. This paper will look to validate and
expand upon a method used by Leo Rebholz in his thesis at Duquesne University in the early
2000’s2.
The ability to predict bankruptcy is largely dependent on time. If waiting until after
bankruptcies had occurred, prediction would have 100% accuracy. If predicting a year in
advance, the prediction may still be fairly accurate, especially if isolating a particular industry.
The further in advance a prediction is made, the less accurate it tends to be, as there’s less
information and more random events, such as fraud, recession, new technologies and processes,
etc.
The value of the knowledge that a company is going bankrupt also decreases closer to the
event. An investor who exits a stock position multiple years before bankruptcy is declared,
while the company still appears somewhat healthy, is generally much better off than the investor

1
2

Altman, 1968
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who waited to exit their position until Chapter 11 is declared, or held their stock through the
bankruptcy. With this in mind, the goal of a bankruptcy prediction model is to minimize the
trade-off in accuracy of the bankruptcy prediction when predicting further into the future.
This paper extends the cusp catastrophe model introduced by Leo Rebholz and Abhay
Gaur in “Bankruptcy as Cusp Catastrophe” in three ways. First, the model is validated by
increasing the sample of companies tested from 400 to every publicly available traded company
in the US over the past 25 years, from 1990 to present. This represents approximately 130,000
time points. Second, a new variable which examines stock momentum is introduced. Third, a
portfolio model is introduced which examines the relative performance of two sets of portfolios,
one filled with high risk companies and the other companies with low risk, according to the
probabilities of catastrophic loss.

Cusp Catastrophe

The underpinning of a cusp catastrophe model lies in the idea that the combination of
moves in cash flow, inventory, liabilities, and assets are apt descriptors of the health of the
business. A company undergoing a time of negative profitability can be buffered by a strong
balance sheet. However, over time the company will increase liabilities, decrease assets, and run
down inventory. There is a moment where the business can be considered to pass a point of no
return. They will not have the cash on hand to fund all of their needs, such as capital
improvements, payroll, inventory, and other business operations. The length of this period will
depend on the original health of the business and the amount of cash burned during the period of
2

unprofitability. Once a company has reached this critical point, it’s incredibly difficult for them
to recover, short of a debt reorganization or recapitalization. Consider the following view of the
cusp from the side:

Figure 1
As a company experiences failure, they move from the solvent upper portion to the lower,
bankrupt portion. Notice that to move back to the solvent zone, a company must move not only
to the right, but must jump up once reaching the point x. The view of the cusp from the top, in
figure 2, incorporates factors which drag a company into bankruptcy, and factors which mark the
original strength of the company and its balance sheet. As the company is stronger, it must move
further to the left to fall of the cusp. The moment a company falls off the cusp is not the point at
which Chapter 11 occurs, but is the point at which the eventual occurrence of reorganization
becomes inevitable3.

3
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Figure 2
Notice that a company near the start of the curve with little financial strength would need
very little to drive it into bankruptcy. This makes sense, as a company with an already
maximally leveraged balance sheet is only one bad quarter away from insolvency; this is the
equivalent of an employee who is living paycheck to paycheck. A company with a stronger
balance sheet must experience either a longer period or much more intense distress to approach
the cusp.

Logistic Regression Transformation

While the cusp model is dissimilar from a logistic regression model in that it is not
probabilistic, consider the following transformation. Imagine the data from a cusp model is
predicted as 0’s and 1’s, and is then run through a logistic regression model. In this case, we

4

would expect a complete separation. While the logistic model would not be able to be created as
maximum likelihood estimators could not be established, the graphical representation would look
like the figure below:

Figure 3
Note that this is a logistic regression model with perfect prediction. However, from the
investor perspective, bankruptcy should perhaps not be viewed as a binary event, and two new
approaches to the model are worth considering.
The first is how the bankruptcy event is defined. Companies commonly file for Chapter
11 bankruptcy or, with decreased frequency, Chapter 7 bankruptcy. Both events are negative for
the stock holder, when compared to investing in a healthy company. However, there are more
events that result in negative returns for an investor beyond filing for bankruptcy. Companies
which announce they may need to file Chapter 11 but end up selling themselves to another

5

company often experience significant value decline. Dilutive stock issuances to recapitalize are
a negative for existing shareholders. A company being taken private during a period of financial
struggle generally has a similar result- in each case, the investor of common stock will have lost
much, if not all, of their capital. While bankruptcy is somewhat trackable, the other scenarios are
related to bankruptcy but much more difficult to track. Instead of bankruptcy, consider a new
variable, called catastrophic value loss, defined as when companies which lose at least 80% of
their market value over the investment period. This value was chosen as it represents a
significant loss the investor, but also results in a large enough sample size to have high risk
stocks in every quarter. This will include more companies than bankruptcy, but is also a more
applicable variable to the investor, as investors do not care why they lose capital, but that they
lose capital.
The second consideration is that bankruptcy is a probabilistic event rather than a
certainty. Healthy companies occasionally go bankrupt or lose the bulk of their value in a very
short period of time due a variety of factors. Fraud, commodity price shocks, or world events
each have their own unique effect on the stock market, business sectors, and individual
companies. These events do not happen often, but the probability of a healthy company
experiencing catastrophic value loss within a few years is nonzero. Similarly, not all companies
that are expected to become insolvent do so. Consider the case of Sirius XM4, which was a
likely bankruptcy candidate. The company received a significant loan to boost liquidity from
Liberty Communications, and in short order became a healthy and profitable company. Pier One
Imports experienced a similar recovery5, without any liquidity boost. These are rare events from

4
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companies that are relatively insolvent, but recoveries do happen at a nonzero rate. Depending
on the probabilities of healthy default and unhealthy recovery, the logistic regression model of
catastrophic value loss could theoretically look like one of the graphs below.

Figure 4a

Figure 4b
The diagram in figure 4a indicates relatively low rates of default for healthy companies
and high rates of default for insolvent companies. The second model in figure 4b has somewhat
more random rates of default and recovery for healthy and insolvent companies. Note that at the
7

end of each range of probabilities, at a and b in figure 4a, and a’ and b’ in figure 4b, the expected
values are still close to zero and n, respectively, where n is the number of companies the high
probability range. At the periphery of the model, regardless of the eventual logistic regression
model chosen, the transformation to logistic regression will result in similar expected values to
the original cusp model transformation, which anticipated perfect prediction. This is pictured in
figure 5.

Figure 5
This paper will pursue three avenues of inquiry. The first is a validation of Rebholz’s
model. The model results of a sensitivity of 82% and specificity of 76% for a bankruptcy
prediction three years in advance would be very investable. However, before investing, need to
validate this across a larger time period. How do his original coefficients perform when applied
8

to the larger sample of companies? The time period of 1990-present is not as homogeneous as
his three-year period in the mid 90’s, and includes two significant market crashes. A drop in
accuracy should be expected, but it’s unclear if the coefficients will need a slight adjustment, or
will have a significant drop off in accuracy. It’s also unclear how the transformation to a new
variable, the 80% drop in market value, will impact the model, as this is likely to be largely
influenced by market crashes. Note that in many previous models, bankrupt companies were
matched one to one with companies of similar size and industry. This analysis makes no such
accommodations, and a substantial drop in accuracy should be expected. However, this makes
the results much more generally applicable.
The second is the impact of a new variable. The new variable will be the performance of
a company’s stock in the quarter after the original prediction is made. If this is statistically
significant, the model can be more accurate in its prediction at 2.75 years (which should be
expected). If it is not statistically significant, this suggests that an investor could reallocate a
portfolio based on stock performance over the previous quarter to maximize profit based on any
stock fluctuations. The variable is a similar idea to momentum- a stock which has been trending
negatively is unlikely to trend upward without a material change in its prospects.
The third line of inquiry is how the model will perform when the future market
conditions are included. Consider the variable quarter, which tracks the time period for a
prediction. This variable will essentially measure the economic conditions of the time period by
swinging the average default probability higher or lower in a given period. While any
bankruptcy model would ideally be forward looking and would not have access to this
information, this could be an incredibly useful model for forecasting portfolio performance and
creating hedges. The investor would be able to create different portfolios of puts, based on
9

possible future market performance. This should yield a more balanced, if not significantly
higher, total return.
With these ideas in mind, the application of this model to a stock portfolio is almost as
important as the statistics which describe the model. Beyond statistics such as AUC, we will
consider the means and medians of two portfolios of stocks: a high risk group and a low risk
group. Few stocks will have a high risk of bankruptcy; any number from a 10% probability of
failure to a 50% probability of failure seems reasonable to classify as high risk. The overall
failure rate is around 3.5%. A low/typical risk would be a number between 2 and 5%. From a
logistic regression model, this idea is akin to taking the probabilities assigned in figure 4, cutting
out the middle section, and creating high and low risk portfolios, as in figure 5. These densities
will likely not be the same, as most companies are healthy. For this reason, high risk companies
are defined as greater than 20% risk of catastrophic lost, and low risk portfolios were considered
at both less than 5% and less than 2.5%.

Review of Literature:

Any review of bankruptcy literature will likely start with Altman’s “Financial Ratios,
Discriminant Analysis and the Prediction of Corporate Bankruptcy.” This was one of the first
pieces of research to gain broad popularity using rigorous statistical techniques to predict
bankruptcies. Altman was similarly interested in the broad classification of bankrupt and nonbankrupt companies. Altman drew from a list of 22 possible variables to predict bankruptcy in
firms between $1 million and $25 million in market cap. His final model used a linear
10

combination of five variables (Working Capital/Total Assets, Retained Earnings/Total Assets,
EBITA/Total Assets, Market Value Equity/Book Value of Debt, and Sales/Total Assets) to sort
these companies into solvent and bankrupt groups, with accuracy one year out above 90% and
accuracy for predictions two years in advance close to 80%. The Altman Z score is still in
existence today, with some modifications, and was one of the first widely cited and used linear
models to predict bankruptcy.
“A Review of Bankruptcy Prediction Studies: 1930 to Present” by Bellovary, Giacomino,
and Akers provides an excellent synopsis of bankruptcy prediction methods up until the mid
2000’s. The publication examines 165 bankruptcy models. Multiple Discriminant Analysis was
the most popular method of analysis through the 70’s, being overtaken by logistic regression in
the 80’s. From the 90’s through today, neural networks have been increasing in popularity, as
machine learning has become more prevalent and computing power has become cheaper.
Many studies with high accuracy have focused on a particular market sector or type of
company. For example, El Hennawy and R.C. Morris were able to achieve an accuracy of 100%
5 years of advance in their study in “The Significance of Base Year In Developing Failure
Prediction Models.” However, their model dealt specifically with English construction,
distribution, and manufacturing compabies of a particular size threshold. As models hone in on
more specific industries and sectors, they tend to be more accurate. This is due partly because
the population is more homogeneous, and partly because the companies are subject to more
uniform exigent circumstances. For example, a stock commodity boom and bust cycle may have
a large impact globally on all mining and shipping companies, a more muted effect on banks and
construction companies, and little effect on consumer spending. In an individual country, that
cycle may have a more universal effect (i.e. countries where mining is a larger percentage of
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GDP exports/imports). The more homogeneous the population, the higher the expected accuracy
of the model. Similarly, it’s often easier for a model to distinguish between bankrupt and nonbankrupt firms that are matched side by side for size and industry.
Neural networks, which utilize machine learning, are increasingly growing in popularity,
and have achieved strong results. However, Rebholz’s model is the primary inspiration for the
paper, and this paper will focus on the ideas inherent in the cusp catastrophe model for
bankruptcy, and applications to logistic regression. The cusp model is similar to earlier ideas,
such as from Dambolena and Shulman, which examines cash flow as a predictor of bankruptcy.
Various measures of cash flows and liquidity measures have long been used as a measure of
financial health. Fraud is also a somewhat predictable measure6, based on changes in
accounting, restatements, or missing financial disclosures. For this reason, only companies
which reported results quarterly were used in the sample.

Methods:

Data was collected from the Compustat database at Duquesne’s Palumbo School of
Business. The data was originally coded in excel, and each variable had approximately 30,000
rows and 90 columns. The columns each represented a different quarter from 1990 to the
present. For example, the first column encapsulates data from quarter 1 of 1990, the second
column from quarter 2 of 1990, etc. Data was collected for cash flow, current liabilities,
inventories, market value, net income, quick ratio, sales, and total liabilities. Market value was

6

Dechow, 2011
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collected from two files, as Compustat queries market value from active companies and the
research set (companies no longer in existence) separately.
Several data codes were present in the Compustat data. The codes are as follows, with
definitions from the Compustat User Guide7:
@AF: Annual Figure (data available at annual, but not quarterly, level)
@CF: Combined Figure (figure is combined in another item)
@IF: Insignificant Figure (the number is immaterial)
@NA: Not Available (company does not disclose information about the item, or was not
in existence at that time point)
@NC: Not Calculable (rules for calculation were not met)
@NM: Not Meaningful (item is not meaningful for a company)
@SF: Semi-annual Figure (data available at semiannual, but not quarterly, level).
The most common data code was @NA, which indicated no data was available for the
period. This error code was primarily used when a company was not yet in existence for a
quarter. Other common error codes were @AF, and @SF (data available only as annual or semiannual figure, respectively). Only data which was available at the individual quarterly level was
used. This decision was made because investors would only invest in companies with
information fully available in SEC filings. As noted in Dechow, financial restatements and other
questionable financial accounting practices are associated with a higher risk of fraud, and

7

Healey, 1999
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negative returns; this makes only using companies with full quarterly data a reasonable rule.
This choice means the data will be consistent. Companies who do not have quarterly data
available may have had accounting changes, non-standardized accounting practices, or technical
errors, among other possible issues. A data point was created if data was available for all
quarters in both the prediction period and every quarter until the results period. The results
period was originally set to 3 years from the prediction period (Case 1 in Figure 6). In some
cases, companies had less than 3 full years of data from the prediction point period to the end
result- generally when a company underwent a merger, was taken private, went through Chapter
7 liquidation, or was delisted. These companies would ideally be included in the analysis, and
still had full data available between the beginning of the research period and the period of
removal. These instances were captured by iterating through cases where only the first 2 years
and 3 quarters were available (Case 2 in figure 6), then 2 years and two quarters (Case 3, figure
6), etc., until 1 year of data was available. 1 year is generally pushing the boundary of when it is
still unknown that a company is likely to merge or go bankrupt, and seemed an appropriate cut
off point. Companies with less than 3 full years of data after the prediction point represented less
than 5 percent of all data points.

14

Figure 6
Additional filters were applied for consistency among companies. All of the penny and
microcap stocks were removed, using both a stock price and market cap filter. The stock price
was set at a minimum of 50 cents for every quarter in the three year prediction period. The
market cap was set at 45 million for the first year of the prediction period, and 35 million for the
next two years. The market cap filter was set at these prices instead of a constant 50 million,
which is used today to delineate microcap stocks, to avoid excluding too many companies from
the early 1990’s. Even so, the sample has more companies from later in the time period than
earlier. This makes sense, as the economy has grown substantially over time, and more
businesses are publicly traded today. The stock price was set at 50 cents instead of 1 dollar for a
similar reason. No limitations were set during the results period. This filter also removed many
companies which underwent Chapter 11 reorganization during the prediction period.
The Compustat database recorded companies which underwent Chapter 7 liquidation, but
did not record data on companies which underwent Chapter 11 reorganization. Many of these
companies were eliminated using the filters for minimum stock price and market cap, but not all

15

were, especially in cases where the reorganization was very quick and occurred during the results
period. The researcher noticed that, in most cases, these companies either had unusually high
calculated returns, or large drops in market cap during the prediction period. The researcher
checked 1300 entries representing 600 companies by manually searching for journalistic reports
detailing bankruptcies, and found 217 such companies8. These were manually coded as
“excluded” in the dataset where necessary. This is because the prediction is for companies
which appear relatively healthy; companies which are currently undergoing chapter 11
reorganization are not healthy, and choosing to invest in a company currently reorganizing
requires a different analysis than is done here. Most of the bankrupt companies experienced a
market cap decline of over 95% in the prediction period; a cutoff of 90% was used. There are
likely still a few companies which underwent Chapter 11 in the data, but this is small number,
based on additional random sampling of companies in the dataset.

Figure 7

8

The New York Times was used several hundred times to verify chapter 11 filings.
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Independence:

A brief note on independence, and the cusp model: consider Figure 7 above, representing
four different time points for a given company. It’s likely that, in a particular amount of time, a
company starting at the point represented by the circle would move no further than the triangle.
It’s also likely that a company starting at the point represented by the triangle would move no
further than the cross in the negative direction or the circle in the positive direction. If viewed
from the perspective of a time series model, it would be a problem that the data would very
rarely, if ever, move directly from the circle to the diamond or diamond to the circle, and would
instead pass through the intermediate points. However, when viewed through the cusp
catastrophe model, what matters is the translated location of the company’s liquidity and
financial data to the plane. Every point to the right of the cusp, represented in figure 7 by the
dashed line, will be predicted as solvent, while every point to the left will be predicted as having
catastrophic loss. The fact that these points represent the same companies at various points in
time and various points of liquidity is not a violation of the fundamental workings of the cusp
prediction; the purpose of each point is to generate a binary prediction. The company and time
point do not factor into the prediction or location on the plane, therefore they do not factor into
the prediction of solvency or catastrophic loss, and thus independence is not violated in the cusp
model.

17

Results and Statistical Methods:

The first model was computed using the exact coefficients from Rebholz’s model, where
a 1 was coded if the model was in the insolvent region of the cusp, and a 0 if the data was in the
solvent region. It suffered from over prediction, with a sensitivity of approximately 25% and
specificity around 70%.
Actual
0

1

0

112342

5700

1

30398

1756

Predicted

Figure 8
Because of the difference in the populations of Leo’s original research and 1990-present,
due to both increasing the time period and changing from bankruptcy to catastrophic loss, it’s
possible drop in accuracy is because the coefficients need to be recalculated, rather than any
fundamental flaw in the model. A project beyond the scope of this paper is likely finding a way
to approximate these values in an ad hoc model. For computational ease, a logistic regression
model was used.
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When converting the Rebholz model to a logistic regression model, two methods were
used. The first stayed closer to the original model. Mathematically, the curve can be rewritten
as follows:
3

27𝑎2

From Rebholz model, predict bankruptcy when

b> √

This is equal to predicting when

0>

4

27 𝑎2
4

- b3

Where b = k0b0 + k1b1 + k2b2 + k3b3 + k4b4 + k5b5 + k6b6
a= min(a’,0)
a’ = n0a0 + n1a1 + n2a2 + n3a3 + n4a4
Where k and n are coefficients for the original liquidity variables a and b.

The a2 and minimum of a’ and zero issues combined are problematic for convergence.
Two models were run- one with the cubic polynomial expansion of the b terms and first degree
of the a terms, and the second with the first degree of the a and b terms. The b1 model had an
AUC of only .726, compared to an AUC of .73 for the b3 model. Neither model is a particularly
good fit for the data. Two portfolios of high risk and low risk, according to catastrophic loss
probabilities of greater than 20% and less than 5%, respectively, were compared. The means
were not statistically significantly different, as noted through the 95% confidence intervals (see
appendix). When a 90% cutoff was used instead of an 80%, AUC improved to .76 for the b1
model and .763 for the b3 model. However, the portfolio comparison was still not significantly
different. Note that it should be expected that AUC will increase for the 90% cutoff as opposed
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to the 80% cutoff, as these should, in aggregate, be a higher risk group of stocks, and thus a bit
easier to predict suffering catastrophic loss.
Given how promising the Gaur/Rebholz model was originally, the model is still worth
exploring. There are currently a few issues which may be addressed. The primary issue is that,
in switching to catastrophic loss, much of the time the companies experience the event in large
clusters. Because bankruptcy was reformatted as catastrophic value loss, the rate of when these
events happened was very cyclical, and incorporated a high prevalence of events from the
dotcom and financial crashes.

Catastrophic loss rates by quarter
14

Percent Loss

12
10
8
6
4
2
0
1 4 7 10 13 16 19 22 25 28 31 34 37 40 43 46 49 52 55 58 61 64 67 70 73 76 79

Quarter, Where 1= Q1, 1990. 5=Q1, 1991
80% Rate

90% Rate

Figure 9
This means that the earlier models not only had to incorporate which companies were
likely to collapse, but would also need to incorporate data on overall market performance. This
is something which can be argued that no one is capable of doing; consider that no hedge fund
has beaten an S & P index fund over a ten year period9. A reasonable inference is that if a stock

9

Rekenthaler, 2017
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manager knew when the market would crash, they would exit their holdings or short the market,
then re-enter once the crash had occurred. Because this hasn’t happened, it’s reasonable to infer
that this skill does not currently exist, for predicting market performance as a whole. By
incorporating the variable quarter, we remove this strain on the model. Essentially, instead of
asking the model both to predict how many catastrophic value losses will occur in a quarter AND
which companies will be in that group, we instead allow the model to know how many value
losses will occur, and to only assign the companies risk. The variable quarter is a time variable
which incorporates the failure rate for a given quarter.
With the inclusion of quarter, the model is essentially a forward looking forecast tool, in
answer to the question of how a portfolio would perform under various expected catastrophic
loss rates in the future. The 80% model had an AUC of .789, and the holdout (50% in all cases)
had an AUC of .786. The 90% model had an AUC of .816, and a holdout of .814. The stock
portfolios were also noticeably different. We’d hope to see decreasing rates of returns, with the
highest returns in the low risk group, moderate returns in the middle group, and negligible to
negative returns in the high risk group. This would demonstrate a risk that was not being
correctly priced by the market. In both the 80% and 90% portfolios, this was achieved. It should
be noted that the high risk portfolio in the 90% group is smaller than that of the 80% group, as
the variance did not decrease by enough to account for the smaller sample size. This resulted in
a larger confidence interval for the mean performance. In the 80% portfolio, using the holdout
sample, the low risk portfolio had a return of 46.7%, with a 95% CI of 45.8 to 47.5. The median
return was 23.75%, with an IQR of -13.46 to 73.64, with 58655 observations. The catastrophic
loss rate was 1.88%. The high risk portfolio had a mean return of 7.35%, with a 95% CI of .41
to 14.29. The median rate of return was -39.97%, with an interquartile range (IQR) of -79.6 to
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34.28. The catastrophic failure rate was 24.685%. For charts, see appendix. While the results
are stronger, the model is not perfect, as some convergence issues exist.
The variable quarter is a definite improvement. However, it’s worth considering another
variable which is not as restrictive. Consider a variable named a5. This variable measured the
performance of the stock in the quarter after the original three-year data period. (This does
shorten the prediction period from 3 years to 2.75 years, and the binary catastrophic loss variable
was recoded to reflect this change). The a5 variable can be thought of in the financial sense as
momentum- with the changes in the inventory, profitability, etc., is the market optimistic about a
stock and driving the price upwards, or continuing to send the price lower? A price up would
indicate that there is information beyond what is present in the current metrics and reason to be
optimistic. A similar variable, coded as a5v2, looked at the stock performance in the final
quarter of the three-year research period. This analyzed the question of if all two-year price
change in the stocks are created equal. Theoretically (by the efficient market hypothesis10), the
price should be all inclusive, regardless of the path it took over the two years, but a stock
trending up could indicate a shift in prospects and market sentiment. The a5 variable similarly
incorporates not only the prospects of the individual stock, but also the market as a whole. A
period of predicted future market turbulence would pressure the price downward and market
exuberance would pressure the price upward. It doesn’t capture cyclical loss like quarter, but
can be conceived of as a guess at both overall market sentiment, and sentiment for a particular
stock. Again, a holdout sample of 50% was considered. The b1 model with the addition of a5
had an AUC of .731, and the holdout had an AUC of .736. While the AUC is not particularly

10

Sewell, 2011
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promising, both a5 and a5v2 appear very likely to be statistically significant, and this suggests
that they may potentially be variables to include in the model with quarter.
The final model included both the momentum variables (a5) and cyclical market
performance adjustment (quarter). Using 80% as the cutoff for catastrophic loss, the original
model had an AUC of .803, and an AUC of .792 in the holdout sample. This is a slight
improvement from the model with only quarter. This model is also a better identifier of the high
risk portfolio. Using the holdout sample for portfolio analysis, the low risk group had a mean
return of 41.97%, with a 95% CI of 41.2 to 42.73. The median return was 22.1%, with an IQR
of -14.08 to 69.15. The catastrophic loss rate was 1.825%. The high risk portfolio had a mean
return of .45%, with a 95% CI of -5.42 to 6.31. The median return was

-36.8, and had an

IQR of -86.1 to 37.96. The catastrophic failure rate was 29.095%. With this new model, it’s
worth considering that perhaps the 5% is too generous a term for low risk, when the overall
failure rate is around 3%. If we instead use a threshold for the low risk portfolio, identified in
the appendix as modified low risk, of below 2.5% probability of catastrophic loss, the mean
return is 47.55%, with a 95% CI of 46.7 to 48.41. The IQR is -5.87 to 74.5, and the catastrophic
loss rate is 1.148%. The sample size drops from approximately 59,000 to 43,000. A graphical
representation of the distribution of returns and rates of catastrophic loss is pictured in figures 10
and 11 below. Figure ten represents the modified low risk portfolio, and figure 11 represents the
high risk portfolio. Note that no convergence issues exist with both quarter and a5 in the final
model. In the appendix, a modified high risk portfolio with a risk cutoff of 15% was compared.
While the sample size increased, the difference in mean returns decreased as well.
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Figure 10

Figure 11
24

For validity, a chi square test was conducted on the analysis with both the a5 and
quarterly variables. For the model as a whole, the chi squared was .867. The chi squared test
was also conducted on the low and high risk portfolios themselves, with the high risk portfolio
having a chi square of 98.5 and the low risk portfolio having a chi squared of 71.2. With 92
degrees of freedom, neither measurement is significant at even the α=.10 level. However, the
98.5 chi squared value for the high risk portfolio is higher than would be ideal.

Reflection

While catastrophic value loss is a strong idea for capturing the effect of market gains and
losses on the individual investor, the market tends to experience the bulk of these events in
cyclical patterns. These patterns may be tied to particular industries, or happen to the market at
large. While some indicators of the total market risk exist, such as Case Shiller, the exact timing
of a large market reversal is difficult to impossible to predict multiple years in advance with
current analytics. This is a tradeoff the model has made to be more applicable to the investor.
There are several areas of further exploration. First, while the Rebholz model suffered
from computation difficulties in recalculating the parameters of a0 through a4 and b0 through b6,
the coefficients that made the ‘a’ and ‘b’ values in the cusp equation, an ad hoc model may be
able to converge to a solution. Consider a cycle which parameterized variables, removed any
values in which a was positive and replaced them with zero, recalculated, and looped through
until a convergence was found. From the portfolio perspective, the chi squared results indicated
that number of catastrophic loss expected to happened and which actually happened in each
25

quarter varied due to random chance. This suggests that a strategy of purchasing puts would
have a fairly regular success rate. It is possible to calculate the theoretical values for the puts
necessary to receive adequate returns, but in most cases the markets have not yet been created,
and would likely need to be done privately through an investment bank. It’s much more difficult
to analyze the expected returns of each quarter, how they compare quarterly, and how they
compare for all yearly or three year periods, due to sample size issues. While difference in the
means of the portfolios are highly significant, the chi squared test analyzed the expected values
of the number of stocks experiencing catastrophic value loss, not the expected portfolio return
value. While the median and IQR stock returns are noticeably different, more research is needed
to turn shorting the high risk portfolio into a stock trading strategy. From the trading
perspective, further research should also be done into the overlap and change in risk for
companies under various expectations of market failure, i.e. the odds ratios relative to quarter.

Limitations:

This paper uses logistic regression in a different method than normally used. Given that
logistic regression is a robust methodology, it is still valid even though the mean rate of
catastrophic loss was around 3.5%. Inflated zeroes would also be a worthwhile investigative
tool, as it does well in circumstances with low rates of incidence.
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Appendix:

Model for b1, 80% threshold
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b1 portfolio comparisons
Low Risk portfolio:
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High Risk Portfolio
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Model for b3
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b3 portfolio comparisons
Low Risk portfolio:
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High Risk Portfolio
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Final Model
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Final Model
Low Risk Portfolio

Note that n missing refers to training sample. Analysis conducted on holdout sample
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Final Model, High Risk portfolio
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Final Model, Modified Low Risk Portfolio (p<.025 used as cutoff)
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Final Model, Modified high risk portfolio (p>.15)
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